Two weeks of public testimony concluded Friday in the U.S. Coast Guard investigation to determine what caused the Titan submarine to implode during a deep ocean dive last year, killing all five on board.
The findings will be published in a report which may include what the panel believes caused the incident; whether there has been misconduct, negligence or violation of law; and safety recommendations that can prevent future underwater vehicle emergencies.
The hearing in South Carolina included former employees and executives of OceanGate, the Washington state-based operator of the Titan. Some spoke publicly for the first time, as did industry experts who sought to bring together the company’s culture and business plan. and the run-up to the fatal dive.
In June 2023, Titan was nearly two hours out to view the Titanic wreck in the North Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Canada when the ship lost contact with its support ship and a frantic search began. The public’s fascination was only heightened by reports that “banging noises” were detected at the search site and by concerns about how long the passengers would last in a cramped tube without oxygen.
On board were OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, 61, who piloted the Titan; deep-sea explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, 77, who had experience visiting the Titanic wreck site; British tycoon Hamish Harding, 58; and Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood, 48, and his son Suleman, 19.
Almost immediately, OceanGate came under heavy criticism as a result of the disaster, partly because civilian passengers paid $250,000 each to go on the expedition, but also because of deadly incidents involving submarines – a handful of which are capable of diving as deep as the Titanic – are almost unheard of. Here are the key revelations that emerged from the Coast Guard hearing:
Debris images helped confirm the implosion
At the start of the hearing, the Coast Guard released photos and video of the Titan’s tail cone resting on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean, near the Titanic’s bow.
While officials concluded in the initial investigation that the Titan was likely involved in a “catastrophic implosion” because the craft could not handle the deep-sea water pressure, the discovery of the debris was what convinced them that no one survived, they said.
The Coast Guard also revealed one of the last messages the Titan sent to its support ship before losing contact: “All good here.”
David Lochridge, OceanGate’s former director of maritime operations, testified that Rush was more concerned about profits and cost-cutting measures than building a viable underwater vessel.
“The whole idea behind the company was to make money,” says Lochridge, who joined OceanGate in early 2016 and was fired from his position after about two years. “There was very little in the way of science.”
Lochridge would become embroiled in a legal battle with OceanGate, claiming he was fired for complaining about quality control.
Another former technical director, Tony Nissen, said he raised concerns to Rush after the Titan’s original hull – made of experimental carbon fiber, which has not been proven to withstand repeated deep-sea pressure – was degraded after it collapsed during a lightning strike. was struck by lightning. test mission in 2018. Nissen said he was fired after refusing to join another test mission the following year and even telling Rush, “I’m not getting in,” referring to the Titan.
Meanwhile, former OceanGate administrative director Amber Bay, who joined the company in early 2019, testified that there were instances where the company could not pay payroll, forcing Rush to dip into its own funds.
“He increased his investment by making a deposit, and we were able to pay the wage bill,” she said, adding that the financial situation was so tight that workers were also asked to defer their wages.
OSHA accused of failing to assess safety issues in a timely manner
In January 2018, after his resignation from OceanGate, Lochridge said he submitted a quality inspection report related to the Titan’s construction to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the federal agency that oversees workplace safety.
Following Lochridge’s termination, OceanGate filed a breach of contract lawsuit, alleging that he violated the terms of his contractual employment by discussing confidential information with other employees and OSHA representatives.
But instead of OSHA following through on its claims, he said the representatives merely dragged their feet — allowing OceanGate to continue designing and building the Titan unhindered.
“I believe that if OSHA had attempted to investigate the seriousness of the concerns I raised on multiple occasions, this tragedy could have been prevented,” Lochridge said.
An OSHA spokesperson told NBC News that the agency has referred its safety allegations to the Coast Guard, which has the jurisdiction to investigate such claims. The agency said it could only review his claims of workplace retaliation, and that “the investigation followed the normal process and timeline for a retaliation case.”
When Lochridge and OceanGate agreed to settle their lawsuit in late 2018, OSHA ended its investigation “in accordance with the terms of the parties’ agreement,” the spokesperson said.
Titan has never been inspected by an industry association
Roy Thomas, an engineer with the American Bureau of Shipping, testified that OceanGate never contacted the organization, which advises and verifies whether a marine vessel meets industry standards.
Thomas said the choice of the main material for the fuselage, carbon fiber, which has long been used in the aerospace industry, is “prone to fatigue failure” under deep-sea pressure. Underwater hulls typically use titanium; carbon fiber is also more expensive.
Thomas added that the organization would never have classified the Titan based on the materials used. The Coast Guard also noted at the start of the hearing that the Titan has never undergone an independent review, which is standard industry practice.
Titan functioned for only a few days before the final dive was doomed
Titan suffered more than 100 equipment problems in the two years before the June 2023 implosion, including the loss of its forward turret during a test dive in 2021 and a mechanical failure that same year during an expedition to the Titanic. That trip had to be cut short.
Titan also malfunctioned for several days before the implosion, marine scientist Steven Ross testified. Rush was piloting a voyage with Ross and others on board. At one point, a problem with the Titan’s buoyancy caused the platform to shift and the passengers to “tumble around,” Ross said. No one was injured, but it took an hour to get out of the water during such a harrowing incident, he added.
“One passenger was hanging upside down,” Ross said. “The others managed to squeeze into the end cap of the bow.”
The exact cause of the implosion may be ‘undetermined’
Expert testimony from Bart Kemper of Kemper Engineering Services provided preliminary findings on the possible cause of the disaster.
Possibilities, he said, include the carbon fiber fuselage breaking, a manufacturing defect related to the fuselage or a problem with the acrylic window.
Ultimately, “the cause of the implosion is undetermined at this time,” Kemper said.
Earlier in the hearing, OceanGate co-founder Guillermo Söhnlein, who left the company a decade before the Titan disaster but continued to defend Rush’s efforts, said the cause of the implosion may never be known. “I don’t know who made which decision. when and based on what information,” he told the hearing panel. “And honestly, I don’t know if any of us will ever know, despite all the investigative efforts of your team.”
CEO OceanGate had arrogant attitude: ‘No one dies’
Witnesses who knew Rush painted a picture of a businessman who strove for innovation in creating a new type of submarine but also refused to slow down.
Matthew McCoy, a former OceanGate operations technician, testified about a “tense” meeting with Rush in 2017 over what the CEO said he would do if he came under regulatory scrutiny at a U.S. port.
“If the Coast Guard became a problem, he would buy himself a congressman and make it go away,” McCoy said, adding that he resigned soon afterward.
William Kohnen, the CEO and founder of underwater manufacturer Hydrospace Group, said he was talking to Rush about OceanGate’s direction in 2018 when industry colleagues noticed what he was doing.
Rush “said the usual response that ‘it’s taking too long,’” Kohnen testified about the industry’s classification of OceanGate’s submarine. “’It’s too expensive and they don’t know this technology. I don’t have time to explain my technology. ”
That same year, Lochridge had confronted Rush about his safety concerns before being fired. In a transcript of the conversation made public by the Coast Guard as part of the hearing, Rush denied endangering anyone with the Titan.
“All I’ve done on this project is people tell me it won’t work — you can’t do that,” Rush said.
“I can think of 50 reasons why we should call it quits and fail as a company,” he added. ‘I’m not dying. No one dies on my watch – period.”
This article was originally published on NBCNews.com