Children are expensive – not just for the parents, but also for the environment – ​​so how many are too many?

People born in the future will inherit a planet in the midst of a global ecological crisis. Natural habitats are being decimated, the world is getting hotter, and scientists fear we are experiencing the sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history.

Is it reasonable to bring a child into the world under such circumstances?

My philosophical research concerns environmental and reproductive ethics – the ethics of choosing how many children to have and whether to have them at all. Recently, my work has explored questions where these two fields intersect, such as how climate change should influence decision-making about starting a family.

Reproduction is often seen as a personal or private choice that should not be scrutinized. However, it is a choice that affects others: the parents, the children themselves and the people who will inhabit the world together with those children in the future. It is therefore a suitable subject for moral reflection.

A lifelong footprint

Let’s start thinking about why it might be wrong to have a large family.

Many people who care about the environment think they have an obligation to reduce their impact: for example, by driving fuel-efficient vehicles, recycling and buying food locally.

But the decision to have a child – to create someone else who will most likely adopt a similar lifestyle to yours – far outweighs the impact of these activities. Based on the average distance a car travels annually, people in developed countries could save the equivalent of 2.4 tons of CO2 emissions annually by living without a vehicle, a literature review shows. By comparison, having one less child saves 58.6 tons annually.

So if you think you have an obligation to do other activities to reduce your impact on the environment, you should also limit your family size.

In response, however, some people might argue that adding one person to a planet with 8 billion inhabitants cannot make a meaningful difference. According to this argument, one new person would account for such a small percentage of the total contribution to climate change and other environmental problems that the impact would be morally negligible.

Crunching the numbers

Environmental ethicists debate how to quantify an individual’s impact on the environment, especially carbon emissions over their lifetime.

For example, statistician Paul Murtaugh and scientist Michael Schlax attempted to estimate the “carbon legacy” associated with a couple’s choice to procreate. They estimate the total lifetime emissions of individuals living in the world’s eleven most populous countries. They also assumed that a parent was responsible for all emissions related to their genetic ancestry: all their own emissions, half of their children’s emissions, a quarter of their grandchildren’s emissions, and so on.

A camera in the back of a minivan captures two adults sitting in the front seat and two brunette children sitting in the back row.

According to their calculations, if emissions were to remain at 2005 levels for several generations, an American couple with one less child would save 9,441 tons of CO2 equivalent. By contrast, driving a more fuel-efficient car – 16 kilometers more per liter – would save only 148 tonnes of CO2 equivalent.

Philosopher John Nolt has tried to estimate how much damage the average American does in his lifetime in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. He found that the average American contributes about one two billionth of the total greenhouse gases that cause climate change. But since climate change could harm billions of people over the next millennium, this person could be responsible for the serious suffering, or even death, of one or two future people.

Collective toll

Such estimates are inaccurate at best. Nevertheless, even if one assumes that the impact of each individual child on the environment is relatively insignificant on a global scale, that does not necessarily mean that reproducers have no moral burden.

A common idea in ethics is that people should avoid participating in ventures that involve collective misconduct. In other words, we should avoid contributing to institutions and practices that cause bad outcomes, even if our own individual contribution to that outcome is small.

Suppose someone is considering making a small donation to an organization that he learns is engaged in immoral activities, such as polluting a local river. Even if the potential donation is only a few dollars – too small to make any difference to the organization’s operations – that money would express a level of complicity in that behavior, or perhaps even an endorsement. The morally right thing to do is to avoid supporting the organization whenever possible.

We could reason about reproduction in the same way: overpopulation is a collective problem that degrades the environment and causes damage, so individuals should reduce their contribution to it when they can.

Moral gray zone

But perhaps having children justifies an exception. Parenting is often a crucial part of people’s life plans and makes their lives much more meaningful, even at the expense of the planet. Some people believe that reproductive freedom is so important that no one should feel moral pressure to limit the size of their family.

Three women, one of whom has white hair, stand around a baby in a blue suit and a pacifier, laughing.Three women, one of whom has white hair, stand around a baby in a blue suit and a pacifier, laughing.

One point of general consensus among ethicists, following philosopher Henry Shue, is that there is a moral difference between emissions related to critical interests and emissions related to convenience and luxury. Emissions related to basic human needs are generally considered permissible. It is not wrong if I emit CO2 when, for example, I drive to the supermarket, if I have no other safe or reliable means of transport at my disposal. Going to the store is important to my survival and well-being. Pure recreational driving, on the other hand, is more difficult to justify.

Reproduction occupies the messy conceptual space between these two activities. For most people today, having their own biological children is not essential to their health or survival. Yet for most people and their broader life plans it is also much more important than a frivolous joyride. Is there a way to balance the varied and competing moral considerations at play here?

In previous work, I have argued that the right way to balance these competing moral considerations is for each married couple to have no more than two biological children. I believe this gives a couple an appropriate degree of reproductive freedom while recognizing the moral significance of the environmental problems associated with population growth.

However, some authors argue differently on this subject. Philosopher Sarah Conly argues that it is permissible for couples to have only one biological child. Her position rests largely on her argument that all fundamental interests related to child rearing can be satisfied with just one child. Bioethicist Travis Reider advocates having a small family, but without a specific numerical limit. It is also possible, as ethicist Kalle Grill has argued, that neither of these positions makes the moral analysis exactly right.

Regardless, it is clear that expectant parents need to consider the moral dimensions of reproduction and its importance to their life plans.

For some, adoption can be the best way to experience parenthood without creating a new person. And there are many more ways expectant parents can do their part to alleviate environmental problems. For example, carbon offsets or donations to environmental organizations are hardly a perfect substitute for limiting reproduction, but they can certainly be more attractive to many parents-to-be.

This article is republished from The Conversation, an independent nonprofit organization providing facts and trusted analysis to help you understand our complex world. It was written by: Trevor Hedberg, University of Arizona

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Trevor Hedberg does not work for, consult with, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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